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MANAGED CARE, ASSISTED SUICIDE, AND
VULNERABLE POPULATIONS
M. Cathleen Kaveny*
I. INTRODUCrION
Some of the most memorable figures in our heated national de-
bate about physician-assisted suicide are the seriously ill persons who
have publicly advocated its legitimacy, drawing their authority from
the power of their own experiences. In certain respects, their stories
evoke venerable American ideals: the idealistic revolutionary and the
moral iconoclast. For example, consider Noel Earley, whose story was
extensively chronicled in the press and on Nightline.' He used his un-
timely affliction with Lou Gehrig's Disease as the occasion to advocate
the legalization of assisted suicide. Earley, a forty-eight year old Viet-
nam veteran and recipient of the Purple Heart and the Bronze Star,
clearly appeared to be making his own choices, for his own reasons,
up to the very end-including his ultimate choice to forgo aid-in-dy-
ing and let the disease take its natural, deadly course.
Or consider Diane, the patient whom Dr. Timothy Quill provided
with a lethal dose of barbiturates and whose story he recounts in a
famous article in the New England Journal of Medicine. She ended her
own life rather than submit to the ravages of chemotherapy or suffer
the end stages of acute myelomonocytic leukemia. As Quill tells the
story, it is difficult to doubt that Diane, who forged a successful work
and family life after overcoming earlier bouts with cancer, alcoholism,
and depression, had made her own, carefully considered decision to
die.2
Even Janet Adkins, the fifty-four year old member of the Hemlock
Society who became the first patient to use Dr. Jack Kevorkian's "sui-
cide machine" in order to avoid the degeneration caused by
Alzheimer's Disease, seems to have made an independent decision to
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame Law School.
1 See Felice Freyer, A Time to Die, PROVIDENCEJ. BuLL., Feb. 16, 1997, at 11 (a five
part special report).
2 See Timothy E. Quill, M.D., Death and Dignity-A Case of Individualized Decision
Making, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED. 691 (1991).
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end her life after experimental drug treatment failed her. A woman
who went trekking in the Himalayas in order to celebrate the onset of
middle age, Adkins lived-and died-on her own terms. She played
tennis with her grown son the week before she took her life and spent
a last, loving weekend with her husband before walking into Dr.
Kevorkian's van. At the end, she profusely thanked Kevorkian for his
help.3
We do not have to agree with the choices made by Noel Earley,
Diane, or Janet Adkins to have at least a grudging respect for their
courage, their independence, and their willingness to live their last
days in accordance with their own beliefs and in defiance of settled
law and convention. But even so, we should be extremely cautious
about changing public policy on the basis of their stories. It is impor-
tant to recognize that even as these three rebels refused to comply
with the prevailing morals of the health care financing and delivery
system, they were also not forced to conform to some of its practical
limitations. Perhaps because of his threat to kill himself, Noel Earley
received the very best in palliative care, as a dedicated team of health
care workers and friends attempted to make his waning days as com-
fortable as possible. In Dr. Quill, Diane found sensitivity and compas-
sion, not the impersonal ministrations of bureaucratic medicine. And
Janet Adkins, who lived in a wealthy suburb of Portland, Oregon, had
the financial resources to arrange for competent, constant care if she
chose to continue living with Alzheimer's Disease. Having the means
as well as the motives to be true rebels, all three made their decisions
for assisted suicide insulated and apart from the constraints imposed
by the American health care system.
But the rest of us might not be so fortunate. Once assisted sui-
cide 4 is legalized, it will quickly become routinized.5 The choice to
3 See Timothy Egan, As Memoy and Music Faded, Oregon Woman Chose Death, N.Y.
TIMES, June 7, 1990, at Al.
4 Physician-assisted suicide is commonly defined as occurring when a patient
ends her own life by ingesting lethal medication prescribed for that purpose by a
physician. If the physician administers the lethal medication to the patient in order
to end her life, it is no longer physician assisted suicide, but euthanasia. One of the
most difficult aspects of the contemporary debate is the significant divergence in the
way such terms as euthanasia are used. For a discussion of the moral meaning of the
terms and their relation to decision-making in a a legal context, see M. Cathleen
Kaveny, Assisted Suicide, Euthanasia, and the Law, 58 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 124 (1997).
5 The Task Force to Improve the Care of Terminally Ill Oregonians has recently
issued a guidebook of professional standards for physician-assisted suicide. See TASK
FORCE TO IMPROVE THE CARE OF TERMINALLY ILL OREGONIANS, OREGON DEATH WITH
DIGNITY AcT: A GUIDEBOOK FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS (1998). The Guidebook is
published by the Center for Ethics in Health Care at Oregon Health Sciences Univer-
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end one's own life will not be the iconoclastic statement of a few
strong rebels, but one more decision to avail oneself of one more
health care service commonly reimbursed by third-party payors.
Rather than a choice made against the health care system, an option
for assisted suicide will be a choice made fully within that system-and
subject to all the dangers of abuse that it contains.
In the summer of 1997, the United States Supreme Court over-
turned the decisions of two circuit courts that held unconstitutional
state laws prohibiting competent, terminally ill adults from ending
their own lives by taking medication proscribed for that purpose by a
physician. 6 The majority emphasized the importance of the state in-
terests furthered by the prohibition, which are not limited to prevent-
ing the "abuse, neglect, or mistakes" that impede an individual's
autonomous choice for or against assisted suicide. According to the
Court, "The State's interest here goes beyond protecting the vulnera-
ble from coercion; it extends to protecting disabled and terminally ill
people from prejudice, negative and inaccurate stereotypes, and 'soci-
etal indifference.'1, 7
The Court did not decide the mirror image question whether
laws permitting assisted suicide are unconstitutional, because that ques-
tion was not before it. Nonetheless, dicta in the majority opinion
strongly suggests that the Court does not intend to constitutionalize
the thorny issues arising from end-of-life decision making, but to leave
them for the states to decide. "Throughout the Nation, Americans
are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the morality,
legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our holding
permits this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society."8
sity. In my view, developing guidebooks on such matters as assisted suicide is very
much a double-edged sword. On the one hand, they may detail procedures that are
helpful in minimizing abuses of the law. On the other hand, they encourage physi-
cians to treat this as one more health care decision folded into a web of policies and
procedures that increasingly engulf the practice of medicine today. I fear that after
the novelty of the practice wears off, physicians will follow-or ignore-policies and
procedures in the case of physician assisted suicide precisely to the same degree that
they do so with respect to other policies and procedures.
6 Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct.
2293 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2302 (1997) (O'Conner, Stevens,
Ginsburg, and BreyerJJ., concurring injudgments) (concurrences to both Glucksberg
and Vacco were published separately from the majority opinions).
7 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2273. For a discussion of the pedagogical value of the
Supreme Court's opinions, particularly with respect to the equal dignity of all per-
sons, see M. Cathleen Kaveny, Assisted Suicide, the Supreme Court, and the Constitutive
Function of the Law, HAsTNrs CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 29.
8 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2275.
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As of March 1998, only the state of Oregon has legalized physi-
cian assisted suicide,9 although legislation that would permit the prac-
tice was proposed in at least twelve state legislature in 1997 and the
first three months of 1998.10 As the citizens of each state continue to
ponder whether or not to legalize assisted suicide, they need to con-
sider the actual situation of the health care system in which most peo-
ple will be confronted with that option. For a growing number of
Americans, the world of managed care provides the medical and fi-
nancial context in which they will make life and death decisions for
themselves and their loved ones. Moreover, managed care is being
implemented at the same time our society has not only declined to
9 By a ballot initiative authorized by the Oregon Constitution, Oregon voters
narrowly approved the Oregon Death with Dignity Act in November 1994, which le-
galized physician-assisted suicide for competent, terminally ill persons. The Act is
codified at Oregon Revised Statutes 127.800-897. Three years later, in the fall of
1997, Oregon voters rejected a heavily contested ballot initiative that would repeal the
Death with Dignity Act (Ballot Measure 51, Or. H.B. 2954-1997).
During the time period between the first and second ballot initiatives, the Act was
subjected to a constitutional challenge that postponed its implementation. Judge
Michael Hogan issued an injunction permanently barring the implementation of the
Act, on the grounds that it violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp.1429 (D. Or. 1995) (equal protection opinion and
declaratory judgment and permanent injunction). In Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382
(9th Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit vacated the injunction and remanded with instruc-
tions to dismiss the plaintiff's claims on the grounds that they did not have standing
to bring the suit. In October 1997, the Supreme Court declined to hear the plaintiff's
appeal from the Ninth Circuit, thereby clearing the way for the implementation of the
Act in the late fall of 1997. See Lee v. Harcleroad, 118 S. Ct. 328 (1997). However,
opponents of the Act have recently asked Judge Hogan to add a new plaintiff to the
suit rather than dismissing it. On February 17, 1998, he asked them for additional
briefing on their motion to add a new plaintiff to the case. Experts do not expect a
ruling from Judge Hogan until April 1998. See Federal Judge Postpones Final Decision on
Fate of Controversial Assisted Suicide Law, Health Care Daily Rep. (BNA) (Feb. 19, 1998).
In addition to challenging the Act on constitutional grounds, its opponents also
contend that physicians who prescribe lethal doses of medication will violate the Fed-
eral Controlled Substances Act. In the fall of 1997, Thomas Constantine, the head of
the Drug Enforcement Agency, expressed his opinion that the Oregon Act conflicted
with the federal law. In response, Attorney General Janet Reno appointed an internal
review team at the Department ofJustice to investigate the matter. As of March 10,
1998, she has issued no final report, although Oregon Senator Ron Wyden has indi-
cated that the internal review team has concluded that no conflict exists. See Ameri-
can Political Network, Inc., Oregon: Will DEA Be Overruled on Assisted- Suicide?, HEALTH
LINE, Jan. 26, 1998.
10 These states include Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. As
of March 1998, it does not appear likely that any of these states will legalize assisted
suicide in the immediate future.
1278 [VOL. 73:5
VULNERABLE POPULATIONS
provide all persons with basic health insurance, but also has deter-
mined to cut back on publicly-sponsored programs such as Medicare
and Medicaid.
In the remainder of this essay, I would like to discuss four issues
pertaining to assisted suicide and euthanasia in the new American
health care system. First, what exactly is managed care? Most people
are familiar with the term, and know vaguely that it is connected with
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs). They may even belong
to a managed care plan themselves. But how exactly does managed
care work? Second, what are the temptations to wrongdoing that are
inherent in managed care, and how adequate are the safeguards now
in place to counteract these temptations? No institutional framework
for organizing human behavior is invulnerable to abuse by persons
determined to put their own advantage ahead of the common good;
all social systems, whether they are educational systems, judicial sys-
tems, or health care systems, can be abused in some way unless effec-
tive measures are implemented to deter such behavior. Third, we can
judge an institutional system by how well-or badly-it treats its weak-
est members. How, then, do vulnerable populations-the elderly, the
poor, women, and disabled persons-fare under managed care?
Fourth and finally, what dangers might we face if assisted suicide is
legalized at this point in the evolution of the health care financing
and delivery system?
I will not hide my conclusions. My concern is not primarily for
the social pioneers and moral rebels in our midst. Almost by defini-
tion, they can take care of themselves. Rather, I am worried about
those of us, our friends, and our near and distant neighbors, who do
not have such independent temperaments, such good medical care,
or such copious economic means as Noel Earley, Diane, or Janet Ad-
kins. I believe that legalizing physician assisted suicide, particularly at
this point in the evolution of managed care, will be extremely danger-
ous to the most vulnerable members of our society, who already are
badly served by the American health care system. To put the matter
bluntly, I believe that legalizing assisted suicide in the current health
care environment is the moral equivalent of throwing a torch on an
oil slick.
II. MANAGED CARE
A. History
In order to understand the nature of managed care, some histori-
cal background is helpful. From the 1960s through the mid 1980s,
the health care industry was dominated by a fee-for-service reimburse-
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ment system, in which a health care provider charged for each dis-
crete service rendered. Apart from the relatively few HMOs, third-
party payors exerted relatively little control over the utilization of
medical services. In the realm of private insurance, employers
purchased coverage for their employees from indemnity insurers, who
in turn paid their portion of the health care costs incurred by their
beneficiaries. As those costs rose, insurers simply passed them on to
employers or other purchasers in the form of higher premiums. Gov-
ernment payors were equally generous. For example, in the golden
days of the Medicare program inaugurated in the mid-1960s, physi-
cians were reimbursed at eighty percent of their reasonable charges,
while hospitals were reimbursed at a hundred percent of the costs
they incurred, including allowances for depreciation on assets."
The incentives under this reimbursement system conspired to
produce a rapid increase in both the number and technical sophistica-
tion of medical services. Hospitals and other health-care providers
were revenue centers; the more services they provided, the more
money they made. Providers were prompted to introduce new serv-
ices, knowing that the cost would largely be absorbed by the insurers
and the federal government. Fueled in large part by these unchecked
incentives to provide more and more medical care, health care spend-
ing in this country spiraled out of control. In 1960, it constituted
about five percent of the gross domestic product; by 1994, health care
spending in this country had reached an astonishing fourteen percent
of the GDP.1
2
B. Three Characteristics of Managed Care
"Managed care" is the label given to a number of health care de-
livery and financing techniques designed to counter the incentives to
use medical resources in an inefficient and even wasteful manner. It
is not any one technique or method, but a number of interrelated
ideas and approaches. Generally speaking, managed care organiza-
tions (MCOs) employ three distinct but interrelated strategies in or-
der to achieve their goals. All of these strategies are employed with
great effectiveness by HMOs, the stereotypical but by no means only
form in which managed care is delivered. They include: 1) adopting
techniques to limit access to health care; 2) restructuring the reim-
11 For a fuller description of the shift from fee-for-service to managed care, see M.
Cathleen Kaveny & James Keenan, S.J., Ethical Issues in Health-Care Restructuring, 56
THEOLOGICAL STUD. 136-50 (1995).
12 See Katharine R. Levit et al., Health Care Spending in 1994: Slowest in Decades,
HEALTH AFFAiRS, Summer 1996, at 132.
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bursement system to include incentives to control costs; and 3) imple-
menting cost-effective care. Each strategy is briefly described below.
1. Adopting Techniques to Limit Access to Health Care
Under fee-for-service medicine and indemnity insurance, patients
and their treating physicians controlled the utilization of medical re-
sources. This type of unchecked or unmonitored access to expensive
medical services resulted in spiraling costs and more than a few un-
necessary procedures. For example, a patient who had a back prob-
lem might simply make an appointment with a high-priced
orthopedic surgeon, despite the fact that his family doctor could have
told him it was caused by too strenuous a game of weekend football.
To combat this phenomenon, managed care has developed a number
of ways to control the use of medical resources. For example, a pa-
tient in an HMO might need the approval of a "gate-keeping" general
practitioner before being allowed to see a more expensive specialist.
In addition, an MCO might employ techniques of utilization review
that monitor and evaluate on an ongoing basis whether the medical
services provided to a patient are necessary and appropriate. Fre-
quently, ongoing utilization review is performed while a patient is un-
dergoing a course of hospitalization or other treatment. If the
treatment is deemed inappropriate or unnecessary, it will not be cov-
ered by the MCO.
2. Restructuring the Reimbursement System to Include Incentives
to Control Costs.
In a fee-for-service system, the more services providers furnish,
the more money they make. In order to combat the incentives to pro-
vide more treatment than necessary that are inherent in the fee-for-
service system, MCOs implemented new payment systems with very dif-
ferent incentives and very different structures. Like insurers, many
MCOs are paid on a capitated basis; they receive a fixed sum per
month for each member enrolled, whether that person is sick or well.
For its part, the MCO agrees actually to furnish each enrollee with the
care called for in her benefit package. It keeps as profit any amount
above and beyond the cost of providing care. Under capitation, the
financial incentives for a provider are precisely the opposite to those
in fee-for-service medicine; a capitated entity makes money by provid-
ing as little treatment as possible. HMOs and other MCOs are not
alone in being paid on a capitated basis. Increasingly, providers who
contract to furnish services to such organizations are also being capi-
tated in order to bring their financial incentives in line with those of
1998]
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the organization as a whole. According to a recent study, ninety per-
cent of physicians expect to have at least one capitated contract by
1999.13
In addition to capitation, managed care providers have devel-
oped a number of other payment systems designed to control costs.
For example, in most cases the federal government now pays hospitals
a set amount of money for substantially all of the inpatient care it
provides to a Medicare beneficiary, which is based on the diagnosis
with which the patient is admitted to the facility. This payment struc-
ture creates an incentive for hospitals to admit patients, but then to
discharge them as quickly as possible. Alternatively, MCOs may pay a
hospital a flat, per diem rate for all the services provided to a patient;
this approach creates an incentive to keep a patient in the hospital as
long as possible while doing only as many expensive procedures as are
strictly necessary. Physicians are also subject to a variety of payment
methods in addition to capitation. For example, an MCO may agree
to pay a physician group at a rate discounted off its normal fee sched-
ule, while at the same time withholding a certain percentage of the
group's compensation throughout the plan year. At the end of the
year, the MCO will release that so-called "withhold" if the group has
met designated targets for limiting their utilization of plan resources.
3. Implementing Cost-Effective Care
The third technique commonly used by MCOs is the develop-
ment and implementation of strategies to make health care delivery
more cost-effective. This can be done both at the level of the individ-
ual patient and at the level of the MCO's patient population as a
whole. At the level of the individual patient, the best MCOs place a
high priority on the integration of care; they insure that providers coor-
dinate their efforts on behalf of persons who simultaneously suffer
from more than one ailment. By requiring such coordination, they
can eliminate redundant procedures and minimize the possibility that
the various specialists treating the patient will work at cross-purposes
with one another. At the level of the general population, many MCOs
are striving to develop and implement "clinical pathways" or "practice
guidelines" that describe a recommended course of cost-effective
treatment for common diseases. By so doing, they can eliminate the
real inefficiency of a system in which each health care provider insists
upon its own way of doing things, no matter how tenuous the scien-
tific basis for such insistence.
13 See Increase in Capitation Likely, 2 Managed Care Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at 1039
(Oct. 30, 1996).
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Closely connected with the development of practice guidelines is
the collection and evaluation of data taken from large numbers of
cases in order to compare the outcomes of various possible treatment
protocols; this data is used to improve and refine practice guidelines
as part of the process of "continuous quality improvement." Great ef-
forts are underway to measure and compare the quality of care fur-
nished by various providers; recall the proposals for Consumer Reports-
like HMO report cards that received so much attention a few years
ago. For example, beginning in 1997, the Health Care Financing As-
sociation (HCFA) has required each Medicare HMO to administer
member satisfaction surveys, as well as to analyze statistics pertaining
to plan performance using a computer program known as HEDIS
(Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set), which was devel-
oped by the National Committee on Quality Assurance, a not-for-
profit organization dedicated to fostering accountability and quality in
health care plans. 14 The current version of the program, HEDIS 3.0,
emphasizes health care outcomes and attempts to address the full
spectrum of health care, ranging from prevention of diseases to
chronic care.' 5 Needless to say, this new emphasis on collecting and
comparing outcomes data will require MCOs to devote great energy
and expense to purchasing and installing management information
systems that are capable of gathering and analyzing vast amounts of
data.
It is this third facet of managed care that promises to make it
worthy of its name; without efforts to standardize and improve the
quality of medical treatment, managed care would be nothing more
than managed cost-cutting. Unfortunately, we are at least several
years away from having reliable, easy-to-use practice guidelines that
cover a substantial amount of ailments.' 6 Furthermore, at present
there are substantial limits to the accuracy of even the most sophisti-
cated quality reports, like HEDIS 3.0, for at least two reasons. First, it
14 The HOFA press release announcing these requirements can be found at
<http://www.hcfa.gov/news/n961018b.htm>.
15 Visit <http://www.ncqa.org/hedis/30exsum.htm> for a summary of HEDIS
3.0.
16 Se4 e.g., William L. Roper & Charles M. Cutler, Health Plan Accountability and
Reporting Issues and Challenges: Despite the New Measures of Health Plan Performance, the
"Accountability Movement" is Still Less than a Unified Front, HEA.T AFFaRS, Mar.-Apr.
1998.
The idea of a system that can produce useful, comparative information
about health plans and services and that can track changes in performance
over time is clearly appealing. However, what some saw a few years ago as a
readily accomplishable agenda for outcomes management and improvement
has turned out to be much more difficult to achieve in actual practice.
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is hard to measure the quality of care furnished by a provider without
accurately taking into account the severity of the patient's illness in a
way that we have not yet been able to achieve. Second, it is possible
for providers familiar with the indicia of quality under a given evalua-
tion system to "game" that system by devoting a disproportionate
amount of their resources to the items upon which the report focuses
as indicators of overall quality.' 7
C. A Complicated and Changing Industry
While the three-fold strategy of managed care is fairly easy to un-
derstand, the organizational structure of many MCOs is not. When
they think of managed care, most people think of an old-style staff-
model HMO. In this model, the HMO owns a hospital or two and
employs a certain number of primary care physicians and specialists.
All HMO enrollees must obtain their care from the HMO's hospitals
and physicians; they all pay their premiums to the HMO's main office.
Because the hospital, the physician offices, and the HMO headquar-
ters are all located within a block or two, it is not difficult to think of
managed care as a distinct, easily identifiable entity.
But this is too simplistic a picture of contemporary managed care.
First, HMOs are far from the only type of managed care entities on
the market. According to the American Association of Health Plans,
the major trade organization for MCOs, in 1996 only 67.5 million
Americans were enrolled in HMOs, while approximately 98 million
were insured by preferred provider organizations, a more loosely or-
ganized form of managed care. Even traditional indemnity insurers
now employ some of the tools of managed care, such as utilization
review, and may require pre-authorization for very expensive services.
At the beginning of 1997, thirty-three percent of all persons who ob-
tained health insurance through their employers were in HMOs; but
half of these were in "point of service" plans, which allow enrollees to
choose an out-of-network doctor in exchange for a lower rate of cover-
age for services provided.18
Second, the relationship among various components of a man-
aged care organization may be extremely complicated. Furthermore,
as of January 1997, only two percent of the 651 HMOs in the United
States were "staff model" HMOs that could possibly correspond to the
17 Arnold Epstein, Performance Reports on Quality-Prototypes, Problems, and Prospects,
333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1, 58-59 (1995).
18 See American Association of Health Plans, Managed Care Facts (visited Jan.
1998) <http://www.aahp.org/menus/index.cfm>.
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stereotype described above. 19 An employer may contract with an
MCO on a capitated basis, which might subcontract on a capitated
basis with a physician-hospital organization to provide services in a
particular area. The physician-hospital association may in turn have
an arrangement with its member hospitals and physicians to pay them
on a discounted fee-for-service basis. The main offices of the MCO
may be far removed from the hospital, and the participating physi-
cians may be scattered across town. In many cases, the MCO is no
longer a physically distinct entity, clearly correlated with a number of
identifiable hospitals, office buildings, and people. It is a "virtual or-
ganization" comprised of an invisible web of frequently shifting con-
tractual arrangements.
Consequently, in today's world, a patient going to see her primary
care doctor may know that her care is somehow "covered," but will
have very little sense of how her physician is paid, the exact nature of
the relationship of her physician with the MCO, and even who is ulti-
mately responsible for the costs of her care. This last issue can be very
important. Many employers decide to pay the actual costs of provid-
ing their employees with health care themselves, rather than purchas-
ing insurance or HMO benefits for their employees. In such
instances, the employer will often contract with an insurance company
to "rent" its network of preferred providers, and to provide claims
processing services. However, the employer, not the insurance com-
pany, is responsible for paying the patients' bills. In this instance, the
question of whether a patient is inappropriately denied coverage may
not be addressed under more stringent state law, but by a more leni-
ent federal law governing employer-sponsored benefit plans, com-
monly known as ERISA.20
Third, not only are the relationships among the various compo-
nents of a managed care organization complicated, they are also very
fluid. Many hospitals are closing. Others are deciding to participate
in "integrated delivery networks" (IDNs) in the hopes of being able to
attract the attention of MCOs looking to expand their provider base,
19 See id.
20 Employee Retirement Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, 29 U.S.C.A. §§1001-461
(1998). In general, a claim that benefits were wrongly denied would fall under
ERISA, which limits a plaintiff's damages to the cost of the wrongly denied treatment.
State tort law continues to apply to malpractice claims. The law is unsettled about
whether an ERISA plan can be held vicariously liable for the treatment decisions
made by providers under contract with them. For further discussion, see Karl Polzer
& Patricia A. Butler, Employee Health Plan Protections Under ERISA; How Well Are Con-
sumers Protected Under Managed Care and "Self-Insured"Employer Insurance Plans?, HEALTH
AFAIRs, Sep.-Oct. 1997.
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or even to accept capitation directly from employer groups. More
generally, in the rush to make themselves ready for managed care,
there is a real danger that some IDNs, or even individual providers,
will accept capitation without any firm knowledge of how to manage
the associated risk.21 State and federal regulatory agencies are scram-
bling simply to keep up with the ever-evolving forms of managed care
that are emerging in the industry. Furthermore, it is not clear how
much authority the states have to regulate the solvency of IDNs that
contract solely with self-funded ERISA plans.22
Fourth, money can be made by squeezing the inefficiencies out of
our nation's bloated health care system. Consequently, for-profit
providers have become an increasingly important presence in the
health care arena. The moral importance of the distinction between
for-profit and not-for-profit health care should not be absolutized.
Some not-for-profit institutions have attempted to avoid their obliga-
tion to contribute to the community in exchange for their exemption
from corporate taxation. 23 In addition to contributing to the com-
mon good by paying taxes (the highest average corporate tax rate is
currently 35 percent), some for-profit health care facilities have also
committed themselves to providing some level of charity care. None-
theless, there are significant differences in the ultimate fiduciary obli-
21 Sections 1855 and 1856 of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 allow HCFA to
contract with risk-bearing provider-sponsored organizations (PSOs), which are essen-
tially IDNs formed by providers. Generally speaking, those organizations must be li-
censed under state law. However, the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services is directed to develop solvency standards for PSOs, and to grant time-
limited exemptions from state solvency requirements to PSOs that meet the federal
standards. The HCFA is expected to issue its proposed rule regarding such standards
by April 1998. Medicare PSO Panel Reaches Consensus; Sends Outline of Rule to HCFA,
Health Care Daily (BNA) (March 9, 1998).
22 See Alicia Ault Barnett, Who Needs the Middleman? Third-Party Players in the Doc-
tor-Patient Relationship, 15 Bus. & HEALTH 34 (1997). But see supra note 21 (explaining
that the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 directs the HCFA to set solvency requirements
for provider-sponsored networks with Medicare managed care contracts).
23 The Internal Revenue Service has set forth certain community benefit require-
ments that hospitals must meet in order to preserve their tax-exempt status. See, e.g.,
Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. See also Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,669 (March 30,
1981). These criteria are also relevant to the tax-exempt status of HMOs, the basic
test for which is based on Sound Health Ass'n v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 158 (1978), acq.,
1981-2 C.B. 2, as amplified by Sound Health Association, Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,735,
(May 29, 1981) and by Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. Some local governments
have questioned the claim of hospitals to be exempt from property taxes, attempting
to exact payments in lieu of taxes. In the fall of 1997, the state of Pennsylvania be-
came the first in the nation to enact a law specifying the criteria a hospital must meet
in order to be exempt from local taxation. The Institution of Purely Public Charity
Act, H.R. 55, 181st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1997).
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gation of tax-exempt and for-profit organizations, which cannot help
but affect their sense of mission.24 A tax-exempt organization is obli-
gated to use its resources to further its charitable purposes, while the
ultimate obligation of a for-profit corporation is to make money for its
shareholders. The health care sector attracted 12.4 percent of the
$2.2 billion in private equity invested by venture capital companies in
the first quarter of 1996. Generally, such companies seek annual re-
turns of sixteen to seventeen percent on their total investments. 25
Nonetheless, management may be hard pressed to meet these objec-
tives in the years to come, because the large inefficiencies have already
been eliminated from the health care.26 There is evidence that inves-
tors are now becoming wary about putting their money in MCOs. 27 It
may be tempting for the more unscrupulous providers to shore up
their profit margins in difficult times by denying necessary care.
III. MANAGED CARE: TEMPTATIONS AND RESPONSES
No way of organizing human behavior is free from temptations to
wrongdoing. In school, the great emphasis placed on grades creates
incentives for students to cheat; in the courtroom, the tremendous
weight given to sworn testimony creates incentives for witnesses to per-
jure themselves. The questions that we must ask ourselves about any
organizational system are: 1) What temptations to wrongdoing does it
involve? and 2) What sorts of checks and balances should be put in
place to deter and detect wrongdoing?
Medical ethicists and health care lawyers and administrators
worked through very comprehensive answers to these questions with
24 The differences in mission likely have widespread influence on how the institu-
tions are run. A recent study by the American Hospital Association and the Ernst &
Young accounting firm showed that for-profit and non-profit institutions can have
significantly different approaches to issues ranging from how trustees are selected to
what is expected of management. Ron Shinkman, Governance Gap: For-Profits, Notfor-
Profits Run Differently, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Feb. 23, 1998, at 44.
25 See Karen Pallarito, Venture Capitalists Letting Bets Ride on Healthcare Firms, MOD-
ERN HEALTHCARE, May 20, 1996, at 108, 110.
26 One of the most dramatic stories of 1997 was the precipitous decline and fall of
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., which had led the industry in profitability in 1996.
See 1997: The Year in Review, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Dec. 22, 1997, at 52. Significant
losses were also experienced in 1997 by not-for-profit Kaiser Permanente and the for-
profit Oxford Health Plans, due in part to the inability of these plans to manage the
enormous growth in enrollment. See Louise Kertesz, Enrollment Albatross: Kaiser's 1997
Loss Shows Downside of Record Growth, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Feb. 23, 1998, at 12.
27 For trade analysis, see Outlook '98: Industry Faces Assaults on All Fronts; Fights Back
with Premium Hikes, Flexible Products, Risk-Shifting, MANAGED CARE WEEK, Jan. 12, 1998,
at 8.
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respect to the old regime of fee-for-service medicine and indemnity
insurance. Briefly stated, the incentives under that system conspired
toward over-treatment: the more services providers furnished, the
more money they made. The common law doctrine of battery pro-
vides a powerful tool to combat these incentives. Essentially, that doc-
trine teaches that no one may touch a person without her consent,
even a physician who wishes to perform a beneficial medical proce-
dure. Medical ethics and health care law began to stress that patients
have the right to refuse medical treatment-and also began to empha-
size that care-givers must obtain a patient's informed consent before
going ahead with any medical procedure. Moreover, the federal gov-
ernment began to develop and enforce its laws against fraud and
abuse in the Medicare and Medicaid programs, which were designed
to deter, detect, and punish arrangements in which providers gave
one another some type of valuable "remuneration" in exchange for
referrals. 28 Other federal laws were implemented that, with certain
narrow exceptions, prohibited physicians from referring patients for
laboratory or other services to facilities in which they have a financial
interest.29 These programs attempted to combat incentives for un-
scrupulous providers to make money by taking advantage of any op-
portunity to provide program participants with covered services, even
unnecessary ones.3 0
The incentives under managed care, however, are substantially
different than those under fee-for-service medicine. Generally speak-
ing, they stem from the fact that providers make money by providing
less care, rather than more care. Consequently, as described below,
they center around undertreatment. Furthermore, these incentives
need to be analyzed at two basic levels: that of the MCO itself, and that
of its participating providers.
28 42 U.S.C. §1320a-7b (1994) (commonly called the federal Anti-Kickback Law).
29 See 42 U.S.C. §1395nn (1994) (commonly called the Stark Law). A useful sur-
vey of state and federal laws prohibiting physician self-referral can be found in James
C. Dechene & Karen P. O'Neill, "Stark II" and State Self-Referral Restrictions, 29 J.
HEALTH & Hosp. L. 65 (1996).
30 Some scholars suggest that health fraud costs private and public payors some
$80 billion per year. See Theodore R. Marmor & Jerry L. Mashaw, Conceptualizing,
Estimating, and Reforming Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Healthcare Spending, 11 YALEJ. REG.
455, 487-88 (1994). For a practical description of the different fraudulent practices
likely to arise under managed care by a lawyer who represents a managed care entity,
see Alan D.B. Bloom, Fraud in Managed Care-New Games by Old Players, 1 No. 10
MEALY's LITic. REP.: MANAGED CARE 16 (1997).
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A. The MCO Level
An MCO that is paid on a capitated basis will make more money
if it enrolls as many persons as possible and provides them with as few
services as possible. Consequently, an MCO has every incentive to en-
roll young, healthy persons who need very little care and to avoid en-
rolling elderly persons or individuals who suffer from expensive,
chronic illnesses. Even in situations where MCOs are legally prohib-
ited from directly excluding enrollees on the basis of their potential
costs (a practice known as "medical underwriting"), there are subtle
ways to attract a desirable population and discourage an undesirable
one (a practice known colloquially as "cherry-picking"). For example,
an MCO might advertise its Saturday afternoon fitness benefits and
well-baby care, rather than its chronic blood pressure clinic. Or it
might develop extensive panels in sports medicine, while contracting
with very few cardiac care specialists. 31
Furthermore, in its quest for efficiency, an MCO might be
tempted to approve or deny care on the basis of hastily developed or
otherwise inadequate practice guidelines. Some MCOs, in the intense
competition for business, may be formulating their own "home-
grown" practice guidelines without adequate scientific basis. Assum-
ing the purpose of these guidelines is to attract cost-conscious benefits
managers, they are likely to err on the side of saving money rather
than providing comprehensive care. Furthermore, even well-devel-
oped practice guidelines will be faced with "outlying" cases from time
to time, which can only be identified by sound clinical judgment. Un-
fortunately, not all MCOs train, encourage, and reward competent in-
dividuals to identify these "outlying" cases. Too often, the MCO
representatives responsible for authorizing out-of-the-ordinary treat-
ment protocols are inadequately prepared to make the decisions con-
fronting them and, consequently, are inclined to defer to the practice
guidelines in ambiguous cases.
31 The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 requires the Health Care Financing Admin-
istration (HGFA) to implement a risk-adjusted payment system for all Medicare man-
aged care plans, which will tie a plan's capitation rate to the health of the population
it serves. The HCFA is currently working on the project, with the goal of initiating it
in the year 2000. However, there are significant drawbacks to the risk-adjustment
process that the HCFA will likely adopt, including the fact that it factors in the costs of
chronic illness only in the case of patients who are hospitalized. Because only twenty
percent of beneficiaries are hospitalized in any given year, payment for the other
eighty percent will remain tied to traditional demographic factors that do not try to
account for health status. Consequently, accurate risk adjustment in setting Medicare
capitation rates is years away. See Medicare HCFA Eyeing Inpatient Risk Adjuster for Man-
aged Care Payments in 2000, Health Care Daily (BNA) (Feb. 2, 1998).
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Third, an MCO might be tempted to discourage patients from
using expensive services, or to place stringent limits on a patient's
available options in seeking care from specialty providers. Theoreti-
cally, in situations where MCOs could be assured of a stable popula-
tion base, they would have a financial incentive to invest in expensive
treatment that might improve the long-term health status of their en-
rollees. However, that incentive evaporates in a volatile market, such
as the current one. Because many employer groups change their cov-
erage from year to year in search of the lowest prices, MCOs worry
that the investment they make now in maintaining or improving the
health of their enrollees will be reaped by their competitors in the
future.
Fourth, in the old days of fee-for-service medicine, health care
providers provided charity care to those unable to pay, funding such
services by shifting the costs to paying patients in the form of in-
creased rates. As employers and the government place increasing
pressure on providers to slash their costs, however, providers have had
fewer extra dollars to cover the costs of patients in need of free care.
The failure of health care reform to provide all citizens with a basic
level of health benefits, as well as the drastic cutbacks to most state
Medicaid programs, has only exacerbated the problem. Moreover,
the increasing presence of for-profit institutions in the health care
arena does not ameliorate the situation. Because for-profit systems
pay taxes, they do not consider themselves under the same obligation
to provide charity care that legally (and morally) binds non-profit, tax-
exempt providers. According to an annual survey conducted by Mod-
ern Healthcare, the five for-profit systems responding to this question
on its annual survey reported charity care costs at 1.1 percent of total
net patient revenues in 1996, down from 1.3 percent in 1995. In con-
trast, the charity care provided by 124 reporting not-for-profit systems
remained at the level of three percent. The charity care furnished by
seventeen reporting public systems during 1996 was twelve percent of
net patient revenues. 32
B. The Physician Level
Similar temptations to wrongdoing exist at the level of physicians
working in the context of managed care. The precise temptations de-
pend upon how a physician's compensation package is structured. If
she is paid a capitated rate that factors in the costs of referrals for
32 See Bruce Japsen & Lisa Scott, System Growth a Close Race: 1997 Multi-Unit Provid-
ers Suruey Finds Notfor-Profits Ahead by a Nose, 26 MODERN HEALTHcARE, May 26, 1997, at
51, 58.
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specialty or hospital care, a physician may have some financial incen-
tive to deny care or a necessary referral. The extent of that incentive
depends upon what reinsurance arrangements are in place to limit
the physician's exposure to financial loss if the patient population she
cares for turns out to be in need of a great deal of expensive services.
Alternatively, some physicians may have an arrangement with an MCO
that tracks their use of outside tests, speciality referrals, and other re-
sources for purposes of considering whether or not to pay them a bo-
nus, or even to renew their status as participating providers. However,
still other physicians may continue to be paid on a discounted fee-for-
service basis by the MCO in which they participate, particularly if they
are specialists.
Given the wide variety of ways in which physicians may be com-
pensated in the realm of managed care, one patient may be con-
fronted with several physicians who will each make their respective
treatment recommendations against a background of conflicting fi-
nancial incentives. Moreover, as Susan Wolf has pointed out, partici-
pation in MCOs confronts physicians not only with conflicts of
interest, but also new conflicts of obligation. They have obligations, of
course, to their patients. In addition, however, in the new regime of
managed care, they may acquire contractual duties to the MCO that
employs them or with whom they have entered into an independent
contractor relationship. Finally, physicians may have an obligation to
ensure that sufficient funds are available for other enrollees of the
MCO who may need medical care.33 At the same time, physicians may
believe that their own financial interest and continuing job security
are at stake in the decisions they make. Nothing in their training or
socialization has prepared them for assessing these competing obliga-
tions or meeting the ethical challenge that they pose. More specifi-
cally, physicians who have been socialized to function in the quickly
disappearing medical culture that protects a dyadic physician-patient
relationship may find themselves extremely uncertain of the nature
and scope of their responsibilities in the increasingly common situa-
tion where they function as one of a number of parties who have some
influence over the care provided to a patient.
C. Systemic Responses to Counteract Managed Care's Temptations
As I noted previously, medical ethicists and health care lawyers
have devoted the past twenty years to counteracting systemic incen-
tives to overtreatment. Unfortunately, the work has barely begun on
33 See Susan M. Wolf, Health Care Refonn and the Future of Physician Ethics, 24 HAS-
TINGS CENTER REP. 28-41 (1994).
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the new challenges of counteracting managed care's systemic incen-
tives to undertreatment. 34 These challenges are likely to prove far
more difficult than their predecessors. Most patients are aware of po-
tential instances of overtreatment simply because they involve a health
care provider wanting to do something to them. In contrast, identifying
instances of undertreatment generally involves the much more diffi-
cult task of attempting to prove a negative; to prove that beneficial
care was not offered to a patient. How, in most instances, can a pa-
tient know whether or not she is being steered away from potentially
helpful treatment? The practical difficulties are enormous.
Thus far, many efforts to detect and deter undertreatment have
been piecemeal. For example, in order to prevent "drive-through" de-
liveries, Congress enacted legislation in 1996 requiring MCOs to pro-
vide minimum hospital stays for maternity patients. 35 In 1997, several
states considered a new round of "managed care" which dealt with
other highly publicized issues, ranging from requiring minimum hos-
pital stays for mastectomies to outlawing contractual "gag clauses" that
prohibit managed care physicians from speaking freely to their pa-
tients about matters ranging from treatment options to the workings
of the MCO itself.3 6 While these legislative initiatives may be moti-
vated by the best of intentions, they are not likely to be completely
successful. Cost-conscious managed care companies will simply direct
their efforts to economize toward other services not affected by the
new legislation.
A second problem is that it is extremely difficult for legislators
and regulators to keep up with the rapidly changing structures of the
health care financing and delivery system; yet doing so is essential if
they are to implement effective counterweights to the temptations to
wrongdoing currently in place. For example, the negotiated rule
committee, through which the HCFA is developing the "safe harbor"
identifying criteria that MCOs can meet in order to assure themselves
of compliance with the anti-kickback laws, did not agree on an interim
34 For example, the HCFA did not issue its final rule pertaining to physician in-
centive plans used by HMOs serving Medicare and Medicaid HMOs until December
31, 1996. The rule can be found at 61 C.F.R. 69034. These regulations were called
for by sections 4204(a) and 4731 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA)
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990), which also set forth other require-
ments, effective January 1, 1992, for regulating such plans.
35 Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204,
110 Stat. 2935 (1996).
36 See New Round of "Anti-Managed Care Bills Await Action in States," Blues Survey
Finds, 3 Managed Care Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 174 (Feb. 2, 1997).
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final rule until January 1998. 37 Representatives of the health care in-
dustry have criticized the narrow scope of the rule as serving only to
complicate the already complicated contracting process in the indus-
try, rather than providing helpful guidance in current market condi-
tions.3 8 A similar problem exists with respect to the regulations
implementing the expanded law prohibiting physicians from refer-
ring patients to health care entities in which they or their immediate
family members have a financial interest.3 9 Consequently, in the cur-
rent environment, many laws designed to provide helpful paths
through the maze of incentives to wrongdoing may provide little if any
practical help to MCOs of good will, and may encourage those of bad
will to take advantage of the lack of clear, workable guidelines.
A third problem is that the preemption provisions of ERISA gen-
erally prevent state and federal regulators from exerting substantial
control over benefits provided by the 2.5 million employer-funded
health benefit plans, through which approximately 124 million Ameri-
cans obtain their health care coverage. 40 Thus, even states that want
to enact comprehensive legislation regulating new forms of managed
care will be extremely frustrated in their goals. To gain a sense of the
scope of the problem, consider that Medicare, Medicaid, and other
federally subsidized programs cover only seventy-four million benefi-
ciaries. 41 For example, in February 1998, President Clinton directed a
series of steps designed to bring federally funded health programs
into compliance with the patient protections proposed in the Health
Care Consumer Bill of Rights, which was proposed by the Advisory
Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care
Industry.42 The President's directive was based on a report prepared
for him by Vice President Gore, which surveyed the possibilities of
37 See Ursual Himali, Fraud and Abuse: Advisory Group Gives Seal of Approval to Man-
aged Care Anti-Kickback Safe-Harbor, 7 Health Law Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 155 (Jan. 29,
1998). The HCFA was required to develop a safe-harbor through a negotiated rule-
making process by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 2007 (1996).
38 See Soon-to-be-Released Anti-Kickback Safe Harbor to Offer Narrow Exception, 7 Health
Law Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 17 (Jan. 1, 1998).
39 See Lisa M. Rockelli, Fraud and Abuse: Self-Referral: HCFA Stark II Proposal Seeks
Zero Risk of Abuse From Self-Referrals, 7 Health Law Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 245 (Feb. 12,
1998).
40 See infra note 43. This statistic was taken from Vice-President Gore's report to
the President.
41 See <http://www.hcfa.gov>.
42 See David Nather, Quality Assurance: Clinton Orders Federal Health Programs to
Comply with "Consumer Bill of Rights," 6 Health Care Policy Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 359
(Mar. 2, 1998).
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bringing the various federal programs into compliance without addi-
tional federal legislation. With respect to ERISA plans, the Vice Presi-
dent concluded that "the Department of Labor has little to no ability
under current law to ensure that ERISA-covered health plans have suf-
ficient consumer protections." More specifically, he stated that "the
Department does not have the authority to ensure that private plans
assure access to specialists, access to emergency room services, partici-
pation in treatment decisions, confidentiality of information, or an
external appeals process." State consumer protections also do not ap-
ply to such plans.43
A key component in deterring temptations to underutilization
will be to empower patients by creating an affirmative duty on the part
of health care providers to disclose information about all possible
treatment options, not simply the ones included in the MCO's prac-
tice guidelines. In addition, it will be important to ensure that appro-
priate grievance procedures are in place for enrollees dissatisfied with
their services. But such procedures will do little good unless they are
implemented in a comprehensive, effective manner. We are far from
discovering how to achieve such a high level of implementation. For
example, according to a report released in October 1996, the HCFA
badly needs to improve the grievance process available to Medicare
beneficiaries, particularly those enrolled in HMOs. HCFA officials
have admitted that many HMOs neither have nor use adequate griev-
ance procedures, despite the fact that they are mandated by federal
law.44 Furthermore, a moment's reflection suggests that grievance
procedures are likely to be of limited usefulness unless special effort is
made to render them accessible and non-threatening to the average
beneficiary. Just like any bureaucratic process, grievance procedures
favor those who have the energy, knowledge, and determination to
advocate their own case in a persistent manner. How many sick or
uneducated persons will unhesitatingly avail themselves of an adver-
sarial proceeding against the health care provider responsible for car-
ing for them? Will not most persons simply acquiesce in resignation
and in hope to the recommendations of their caregivers?
In short, the temptations to wrongdoing inherent in managed
care are not likely to be alleviated by the legislative efforts currently
underway at both the state and federal levels. It is my own belief that
43 Highlights of Reports of Five Agencies' Record of Compliance with Consumer Bill of
Rights in Implementation of Federal Health Programs, Forwarded from Vice-President Gore to
President Clinton, Feb. 20, 1998, 6 Health Care Policy Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 390 (Mar. 2,
1998).
44 See HMO Grievance and Appeals Process Is Top HCFA Priority, Conference Told, 2
Managed Care Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 912-13 (Sept. 25, 1996).
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we will not be able effectively to combat these temptations without a
thorough-going reform of the health care system to ensure that all
persons have access to basic health care, and that the costs of provid-
ing such care are equitably distributed. Unfortunately, our nation al-
lowed that opportunity to pass us by several years ago. It seems
unlikely to return to us in the near future. According to the U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau, approximately 40.6 million people, or 15.4 percent of the
population, lacked health care insurance in 1995. 4 5 A disproportion-
ate amount of these individuals were poor. Of persons living at or
below the poverty line, 30.2 percent were uninsured.46 As described
below, it is the poor and other groups of vulnerable persons who have
the most cause to worry in the new regime of managed care.
IV. MANAGED CARE AND VULNERABLE POPULATIONS
How do vulnerable populations fare under managed care? To
the extent that there is less money available for uncompensated care
for those without insurance, not very well at all.47 But what about vul-
nerable populations who do have some form of health coverage? In
particular, what is the fate of the elderly, the poor, and the chronically
ill who seek their health services from MCOs? These questions has
become increasingly important in light of recent and ongoing
changes to the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
In order to control costs, more and more states are moving their
Medicaid population into managed care programs, which have the po-
tential of saving as much as thirty percent in health care costs. 48 The
number of Medicaid beneficiaries enrolled in managed care has ex-
panded dramatically, from 800,000 in 1983 to twelve million in 1996.
45 Congress took a significant step toward stabilizing eligibility for insurance for
those who receive it through their employment by enacting the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1937 (1996).
Among other things, this Act greatly limited the ability of group health plans to ex-
clude persons from coverage on the basis of pre-existing conditions, or to discrimi-
nate on the basis of health status in offering coverage. A major consequence is that
persons insured through one employer will be able to change jobs without worrying
that the plan offered by their new employer will impose onerous waiting periods or
exclusions before covering them. However, the law does not prevent insurers from
charging premiums commensurate with the costs of insuring high-risk patients.
46 See 22 HEALTH LEois. & REG., Oct. 2, 1996, at 3.
47 For an argument that the burgeoning of Medicaid managed care programs
harms the uninsured segment of the population by reducing the funds available for
providers to construct a "safety net" for those without coverage, see Note, The Impact of
Medicaid Managed Care on the Uninsured, 110 HARV. L. REV. 751 (1997).
48 See Managed Care Can Save States Over 30 Percent, Actuaries Say, 2 Managed Care
Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 427 (May 1, 1996).
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The Medicaid population poses special challenges to managed care.
Their health status is substantially worse than that of the general pop-
ulation; Medicaid enrollees include significant numbers of persons
with HIV/AIDS, as well as the elderly, the disabled, and those suffer-
ing from chronic physical or mental illness. Many of them may not
speak English well and may have trouble negotiating the bureaucracy.
Thus far, however, the majority of persons moved into Medicaid
managed care have not been beneficiaries who have suffered from
complex health problems, such as the elderly or the disabled. That is
about to change. The next several years will bring a greater number
of attempts to move expensive populations into Medicaid managed
care. According to a recent Health Trends report, "managed care's
ability to reap savings for the Medicaid program will depend on the
success of these efforts," because this population consumes a large
percentage of the program's resources. 49 In 1995, Medicaid benefi-
ciaries with disabilities consumed almost forty percent of Medicaid's
expenditures, although they constituted only seventeen percent of the
beneficiaries of that program. 50 Unfortunately, managed care provid-
ers have little experience in serving the population mix they are likely
to encounter among Medicaid beneficiaries. 51 A recent report by
Mathematic Policy Research, Inc. found that the early experiences of
Hawaii, Rhode Island, and Tennessee with Medicaid managed care
suggest these states needed more time to plan and implement the pro-
grams, in part because of managed care's lack of experience with the
relevant patient groups. 52
Managed care is also a crucial component of the future of the
Medicare program. In 1995, about seven percent of all Medicare ben-
eficiaries were enrolled in risk-bearing HMOs; that percentage is pre-
dicted to rise to fifteen percent by the year 2002. Furthermore,
Medicare will not only be required to move a greater number of en-
rollees into managed care, it will be forced to do so with less money.
In order to ensure the solvency of the program, the Balanced Budget
49 Managed Care: Report Predicts Rocky Industry Future Despite Continued Short Term
Growth, Health Care Policy Rep. (BNA) at 2 (Feb. 9, 1998), quoting HEALTH TRENDS'
1998 GUIDE TO MANAGED CARE MARKETS (1998).
50 See Medicaid: HHS IG Suggests Research Needed on Aiming Cost Control at Disabled,
Health Care Policy Rep. (BNA) at 2 (Aug. 11, 1997) (quoting Report, Office of the
Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services, Aug. 11, 1997).
51 For a discussion of the challenges facing states as they move Medicaid popula-
tions into managed care, see Arnold M. Epstein, Medicaid Managed Care and High
Quality: Can We Have Both?, 278 JAMA 1617 (1997).
52 See States Confront Major Challenges as Medicaid Embraces Managed Care, 3 Man-
aged Care Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 170-72 (Feb. 19, 1997).
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Act of 1997 was enacted with the intention of cutting Medicare spend-
ing by $115 billion over the next five years; about one-third of this
amount will come from its managed care programs. 53
As with Medicaid, the challenges faced by Medicare managed
care will also be considerable. Like Medicaid enrollees, Medicare
beneficiaries also have a special set of needs; they utilize more serv-
ices, require more intense specialty care, and suffer from a larger
number of chronic conditions than does the general population of
HMO members.54 Furthermore, it would not be surprising if both
regulators and beneficiaries experienced some disruption as a result
of the massive restructuring of the Medicare program inaugurated by
the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. Current Medicare managed care
contracts will be phased out as enrollees transfer to one of eight types
of "Medicare + Choice" plans. The HCFA is required by this legisla-
tion to produce a whole range of new regulation for these plans, in-
cluding developing solvency standards for "provider sponsored
organizations" that wish to obtain managed care contracts without as-
sociating with an insurance company. In its semiannual regulatory
agenda in the fall of 1997, the HCFA enumerated the rule-making
required in order to implement the Act, which included thirty-four
proposed rules under development, forty-six final rules, and forty-one
long-term actions.55
How have Medicare and Medicaid populations fared under man-
aged care thus far? The results are mixed.56 It appears that for
healthy enrollees and those with commonly occurring acute illnesses,
managed care is an acceptable option. A recent study of New York's
Medicaid managed care program concludes that "managed care en-
rollees have greater odds of having a usual source of care and seeing
the same provider there; enrollees have usually better and at least as
good access to care; and they rate satisfaction with care higher or at
53 See D. Ward Pimley, Legislation and Other Developemeins, Medicare Rep. (BNA)
No. 32, at 18 (Aug. 8, 1997).
54 See MCOs Face Opportunities, Challenges, in Medicare, Medicaid Markets, Report Says,
2 Managed Care Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 1078-81 (Nov. 13, 1996).
55 See Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, 62 Fed.
Reg. 57,458 (1997).
56 For example, a recent study concludes that although most disabled persons in
Medicare HMOs do not experience access problems and they are more likely to re-
port such problems than disabled persons in fee-for-service Medicare plans. See Mar-
sha Gold et al., Disabled Medicare Beneficiaries In HMOs: The First Comprehensive Look at
how Disabled Medicare Beneficiaries Fare Under Medicare Managed Care, HEALTH AFFAIRS,
July-Aug. 1997.
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least as high as conventional Medicaid beneficiaries. '57 Another posi-
tive study concluded that elderly HMO enrollees who were hospital-
ized for acute myocardial infarction received health care that was
better in terms of process, and equal in terms of mortality outcomes,
than the care received by fee-for-service patients. 58
On the other hand, other studies suggest that those with serious
and long-term health problems may have real cause to worry. A large,
long-term study published in the October 2, 1996 issue of JAMA, the
Journal of the American Medical Association, concluded that chroni-
cally ill elderly and poor patients enrolled in HMOs were twice as
likely to experience an unfavorable health outcome as fee-for-service
patients in the four year period from 1986 through 1990.59 Further-
more, a study conducted by the Physician Payment Review Commis-
sion, entitled "Access to Care in Medicare Managed Care: Results
from a 1996 Survey of Enrollees and Disenrollees," concluded that
special groups, such as the non-elderly disabled and individuals in fair
or poor health, had significantly higher rates of difficulty in accessing
care in Medicare HMOs than persons in better health.60 Particularly
poignant are the results of a recent survey concluding that stroke vic-
tims enrolled in managed care are significantly less likely to be dis-
charged to rehabilitation programs or to return home than their fee-
for-service counterparts. 61 A recent national survey found that twenty-
six percent of Medicare-HMO enrollees would not recommend their
health plans to persons suffering from serious ill health. 62
These studies are particularly troublesome because vulnerable
groups are not as likely to be able to protect themselves in the increas-
ingly bureaucratized world of managed care. There is evidence that
the elderly are more likely to cede decision-making authority to their
physicians, which could be a dangerous practice in a world where phy-
57 Jane E. Sisk et al., Evaluation of Medicaid Managed Care: Satisfaction, Access, and
Use, 276JAMA 54 (1996).
58 See David M. Carlisle, HMO vs. Fee-for-Service Care of Older Persons with Acute Myo-
cardial Infarction, 82 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1626-30 (1992).
59 See John E. Ware, Jr. et al., Differences in 4-Year Health Outcomes for Elderly and
Poor, Chronically Ill Patients Treated in HMO and Fee-For-Service Systems: Results from the
Medical Outcomes Study, 276 JAMA 1039-47 (1996).
60 See Federal Oversight Needed to Ensure Managed Care Quality, Senate Panel Told, 2
Managed Care Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at 1106 (Nov. 20, 1996).
61 See James R. Webster, Jr. & Joseph Feinglass, Stroke Patients, "Managed Care,"
and Distributive Justice, 278 JAMA 161 (1997).
62 See Lyle Nelson et al., Access to Care in Medicare HMOs, 1996: Elderly Americans
Give Medicare Managed Care a Mixed Assessment, HEALTH AFFAiRs, March-Apr. 1997.
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sicians have financial incentives to withhold treatment. 63 Battling an
adverse treatment decision may take more energy and persistence
than chronically ill persons can muster. Furthermore, informing and
empowering Medicaid recipients will take special efforts, as well as
sensitivity to the cultural differences of various minority populations.
A recent article examining the waiver applications submitted by sev-
eral states to the federal government in order to move their Medicaid
populations into managed care concluded that the programs
designed by the states largely have failed to address the special needs
and possibilities for abuse of poor and minority populations. 64
Thus statistics suggest that the most vulnerable members of our
population-the sickest of the elderly and poor-are at higher risk in
Medicare and Medicaid managed care. These are precisely the
groups who have the most to fear with the legalization of physician-
assisted suicide.
V. LEGALIZING ASSISTED SUICIDE: THROWING A TORCH
ON T=E OL SLICK
To summarize, the current health care system, dominated as it is
by managed care, is volatile. It is also dangerous, particularly for vul-
nerable populations. Efforts to achieve universal health insurance by
some sort of thoroughgoing reform of that system have broken down.
At the same time, activities designed to restructure the health care sys-
tem have continued unabated in response to the unrelenting impera-
tives of both private payors (employers) and public payors (state and
federal governments) to contain costs. Because of the failure of
health care reform, legislative efforts to curb the worst tendencies of
managed care are likely to be a patchwork of experiments. The poor
and the elderly are likely to bear the brunt of their failures. Some of
the reasons we have cause for concern about introducing physician
assisted suicide into the volatile world of managed care are outlined
below.
A. The High Cost of Dying
Dying is an expensive activity. Care for the terminally ill has been
estimated to constitute ten percent of the nation's health care ex-
penditures; it consumes an estimated twenty-seven percent of the
Medicare program's budget. Forty percent of that amount is incurred
63 See Analee E. Beisecker, Aging and the Desire for Information and Input in Medical
Decisions: Patient Consumerism in Medical Encounters, 28 GERONTOLOGIST 330 (1988).
64 See Vemellia Randall et al., Section 1155 Medicaid. Waivers: Critiquing the State
Applications, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1069, 1140-42 (1996).
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during the final month of an elderly patient's life.65 Unfortunately,
the highly publicized alternatives of choosing hospice care and es-
chewing all use of expensive technological measures that only serve to
prolong the dying process are not likely to save much money. Recent
studies suggest that such measures barely make a dent in the costs of
end-of-life care; they are estimated to save as little as zero to ten per-
cent of the costs of dying.6 6
From a purely financial perspective, it is clear that MCOs-and
more importantly, the public and private health care purchasers
whom they serve-could find it very tempting to encourage a dying
patient to avail herself of physician-assisted suicide. Furthermore, this
temptation could be strengthened, and perhaps even rationalized, by
the manner in which advocates of assisted suicide have justified the
practice. More specifically, many of those advocates construe the
choice of assisted suicide to be rooted in autonomy, in an individual's
right to determine a fitting ending for her life.67 At the same time,
advocates also present assisted suicide as offering a real benefit to the
terminally ill by allowing them to circumvent what is portrayed as the
personal disintegration and degrading dependency associated with
the process of dying. Consequently, it would not be difficult for cost-
conscious benefits managers to rationalize an approach that facili-
tated a patient's choice of assisted suicide by seeing it as beneficial
both to the plan and to the patient herself. There is reason to fear
that a patient might be subtly encouraged to exercise her "right," in
the words of Ninth Circuit Judge Reinhardt, "to determine the time
and manner of one's own death"6 8-and to do it in the most cost-
efficient time and manner possible.
B. The Value System of Managed Care
In order to combat the inefficiency and waste of fee-for-service
medicine and indemnity insurance, most MCOs have made "cost-ef-
fectiveness" their watchword. The power of this ideal is exemplified in
the concept of outcomes measurement, which calls for the value of a
discrete medical intervention to be measured in terms of the improve-
ment that it brings about in a patient's condition. 69 From the per-
65 See Gloria Shur Bilchik, Dollars and Death: Physician-Assisted Suicide and Spending
for Critically Ill Patients, Hose. & HEALTH NETWORKS, Dec. 20, 1996, at 18.
66 See Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Cost-Savings at the End of Life: What Do the Data Show?,
275JAMA 1907, 1913 (1996).
67 See RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION (1993).
68 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 1996).
69 The Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations is an
independent, not-for-profit entity that evaluates and accredits more than 18,000
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spective of the values animating the outcomes measurement
movement, medical care does not have inherent value, but only in-
strumental value. Its worth can be judged solely in terms of the results
it achieves and the resources it consumes in order to obtain them.
This way of assessing the value of medical treatment has its uses. It
works best, for example, with respect to immunization or screening
programs designed to improve the health of an entire population. It
also reminds us that health care consumes scarce resources that
should not be wasted on expensive and useless procedures.
However, in determining what counts as an "expensive and use-
less procedure," it is important to remember that a significant part of
what we mean by "health care" cannot be captured in the essentially
utilitarian framework employed by the outcomes measurement move-
ment. The care and comfort of the dying furnishes a perfect example
of this fact. The dying process is extremely inefficient. The outcome,
by definition, is always negative-death. Providing care-or not pro-
viding care-to patients during their period of dying does not change
that outcome. Yet most of us would acknowledge that the value of
medical attention provided to patients during this period cannot be
determined solely with respect to the outcome produced, but is in
many respects inherent to the care-giving process itself. That process
includes, but encompasses more than, the effectiveness of various
methods of controlling pain and maximizing patient function during
a period of inevitable decline. At the core of caring for the dying is
the refusal of the medical community to abandon a suffering human
being, and its continuing determination to offer her company, gui-
dance, and the benefits of their finite art. Assuming that medical care
has intrinsic value, it matters that a patient's physician spends time with
her during her dying process. The physician's role is not constricted
to the high-cost technology she provides; it also encompasses the less
tangible benefits conferred by her presence as a professional exper-
ienced in the way that embodied human beings take their leave from
earthly existence.
It is not clear that the prevailing value system of managed care, in
particular its overriding emphasis on cost-effectiveness, can accommo-
date this way of understanding the good of medical care. Unless we
health care providers in the United States, including hospitals, long-term care facili-
ties, networks, and home care programs. In 1997, it launched the ORYX program,
which aims to integrates outcomes measurement and other performance measures
into the accreditation process. The program will be phased-in over time. For the year
1997, each accredited network is required to select and begin to use at least ten per-
formance based measures. For more information on the ORYX program, visit <http:/
/wvw.jcaho.org/perfmeas/oryx/oryx_frm.htm>.
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take care to emphasize the importance of the wisdom that medical
professionals can offer patients as a unique combination of their intel-
ligence, training, and experience in caring for dying human beings,
the value system of managed care might very well deem their spend-
ing a significant amount of time with terminally ill patients to be inef-
ficient allocation of resources. The meaning of being a physician will
be shriveled to its technical component, while the sustained human
interaction that renders medicine a "profession" will be relegated to
less expensive para-professionals (for example, nurses' aides).
Furthermore, the increasingly prevalent concept of "patient satis-
faction" seems inadequate to capture the complexities of a dying pa-
tient's relationship with her physician. In order to supplement the
outcomes-based measures that are used to track the "objective" suc-
cess of medical care provided by HMOs, the concept of patient satis-
faction is used to measure the subjective reaction of enrollees to the
care that they receive. 70 However, the usefulness of measuring patient
satisfaction presupposes a situation in which a customer's desires and
objectives are stable and more or less well-defined before the good or
service is provided, and that the customer can accurately evaluate the
quality of that good or service in terms of how effectively those desires
and objectives were satisfied. Yet drawing upon the care of the medi-
cal profession during a time of great crisis is not parallel to purchasing
a car or a stereo system, cases where satisfaction may be an accurate
measure of value. A patient who is seriously ill or dying is not likely to
have a stable set of desires and objectives; instead, she is being forced
radically to redefine her sense of priorities. Many psychologists (most
notably, Elizabeth Kubler-Ross 7 1) have explored the stages that termi-
nally ill persons pass through in the process of letting go of life, which
frequently involve significant moments of anger and denial. During
this process, a dying patient will need to relinquish many old desires
and cultivate new objectives that take into account the existential real-
ity of her imminent death. For many of us, this will not be an easy
70 In developing Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS) 3.0,
the set of performance measures designed to enable employers and other health care
purchasers to compare the quality of managed care plans, the National Committee
for Quality Assurance (NCQA) emphasized the inclusion of a number of measures
designed to consider patient satisfaction. According to NCQA, this emphasis "reflects
the opinion that encounters with the health plan should occur in a manner that is
responsive to and respectful of the preferences and interests of its members, and that
its members' satisfaction is the most revealing summary of the extent to which this is
so." Visit <http://www.ncqa.org/hedis/30exsum.htm>, the NCQA's web page, which
contains a helpful description of the goals of HEDIS.
71 See ELISABETH KUBLER-Ross, ON DEATH AND DYING (1993).
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task, or one untouched by conflict with others. If the physician and
care-giving team accompanying the patient through this process do
theirjobs well, their relationship with the patient may at times include
significant amounts of strain, if not outright antagonism, as they help
the patient to face the reality of her illness and imminent death. If
this is the case, then introducing "patient satisfaction" as a measure of
quality may be detrimental to good care of the dying. Just as teachers
may be tempted to value popularity over their professional obligation
to inculcate sometimes difficult lessons in order to do well on student
course evaluations, so physicians and health care systems may be
tempted to avoid their obligations to challenge as well as comfort pa-
tients confronting serious illness or death, in order to achieve a
higher score on the patient satisfaction tests that will in part deter-
mine their standing in the eyes of their MCO.
In short, unless we can articulate and defend a profound under-
standing of the intrinsic value of caring for persons who will never
again become well, physician-assisted suicide will increasingly appear
to be the preferred option to "treat" the dying process. It is fast, inex-
pensive, and minimizes the consumption of "useless" resources in car-
ing for and comforting a person soon to die in any case.
C. The Limits on the Physician-Patient Relationship
Third, most advocates of assisted suicide presuppose that it will
take place in the context of a caring, long-term physician-patient rela-
tionship, such as Dr. Quill had with Diane. However, for many pa-
tients, that type of relationship is quickly becoming the exception,
rather than the rule. Because many employers frequently decide to
shift health plans in an effort to obtain a better price, their employees
may be forced to change physicians if their doctor is not a participat-
ing provider in their new plan. Furthermore, because physician time
is valuable, most managed care plans do not allow significant opportu-
nity for patients to get to know their physicians, or for their physicians
to get to know them, in anything more than a superficial way. Conse-
quently, it is extremely unrealistic to expect physicians in today's
MCOs to be of significant help to patients grappling with the issues
surrounding assisted suicide.
Unfortunately, the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, which no
doubt serves as a model for other state legislatures that consider legal-
izing assisted suicide, utterly fails to take into account the radical way
in which managed care will alter the physician-patient relationship. In
effect, the Act naively presupposes that a terminally ill patient's physi-
cian will serve as a reliable and disinterested guide to the decision-
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making process of a dying patient. For example, the Act includes no
provision prohibiting a physician providing a patient with a lethal pre-
scription from having a financial interest in the patient's early death,
nor even a provision directing the prescribing physician to disclose
the nature and extent of any such interest that she does possess.
There is no requirement that each patient's request for a lethal pre-
scription be reviewed by an independent body whose members are
not subject to the managed care plan responsible for the patient's
health care. While the Act requires witnesses to the patient's written
request for a lethal prescription, it does not require witnesses to moni-
tor all conversations between the physician and the patient about as-
sisted suicide.72 As Daniel Callahan and Margot White have argued in
their exhaustive critique of the Oregon Act and similar legislation in
other states, it is impossible simultaneously to achieve the two objec-
tives commonly articulated by advocates of legalizing assisted suicide:
protecting the confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship
and creating a vigilant system of oversight to prevent abuse.73 Finally,
the potential for abuse is compounded because the Act confers broad
civil and criminal immunity for physicians who participate in an as-
sisted suicide in good faith.74
D. The Plight of the Vulnerable
Finally, I would like to suggest that the populations who are al-
ready vulnerable under managed care will be in particular jeopardy if
physician-assisted suicide is legalized. In 1994, the blue-ribbon New
York State Task Force on Life and the Law concluded that the prac-
tices of assisted suicide and euthanasia "would be profoundly danger-
ous for large segments of the population," particularly for, "those
whose autonomy and well-being are already compromised by poverty,
lack of access to good medical care, or membership in a stigmatized
social group. '75 The policy judgment against legalizing assisted death
72 See OR. REV. STAT. 127.810 § 2.02 (Supp. 1996).
73 See Daniel Callahan & Margot White, The Legalization of Physician-Assisted Sui-
cide: Creating a Regulatoy Potemkin Village, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 1 (1996).
74 See Or. REv. STAT. 127.885 § 4.01 (Supp. 1996). While the exertion of coercion
and undue influence are specifically exempted from the immunity provided by the
Act, OR. REV. STAT. 127.890 § 4.02(2) (Supp. 1996), it is not clear how these practices
would be identified or proven in light of the fact that the Act imposes no duty to
report suspected abuse. See Callahan & White, supra note 73, at 56-61. They contrast
the lack of reporting requirements here with the existence of such requirements in
many states with respect to child abuse and elder abuse.
75 THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH IS
SOUCHT: ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT vii-viii (1994).
[VOL. 73:51304
VULNERABLE POPULATIONS
was reached unanimously by a group whose members held differing
positions on the morality of euthanasia and assisted suicide. Incredi-
bly, in its opinion striking down a New York law prohibiting aiding
and abetting suicide, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals did not
mention, let alone refute, the Task Force's conclusion. 76
Disabled persons have particular cause to worry about the legali-
zation of assisted suicide in the context of a managed healthcare sys-
tem. As many ethicists have argued, there is no reason to think that a
narrow decision to legalize assisted suicide in the case of competent,
terminally ill patients will not rapidly expand to permit intentional
killing in a much broader set of cases. Briefly, the argument for ex-
pansion runs as follows. First, if we allow assisted suicide but prohibit
euthanasia, will we not discriminate against persons who are too debil-
itated to take the lethal medication on their own? Moreover, advo-
cates of assisted suicide have argued that the unreliability of lethal
prescriptions means that it will always be necessary for a physician to
stand by and "administer the coup de grace if necessary."77 Second, if
we allow the terminally ill to take their own lives in order to avoid
great suffering, why should we not do the same for those who are
suffering greatly although their death is not imminent? One could
argue that they stand in greater need of the service, because they are
condemned to a longer period of suffering. Third, if relief of suffer-
ing is the aim of allowing the procedure, then why limit it to those
who are competent? Just as surrogate decision-makers can make a
wide range of other decisions for incompetent patients, so they should
be able to make this decision as well. 78
Once "the right to die" has been so expanded, there is reason to
fear that it will combine with two other factors to create undue pres-
sure upon persons with disabilities to end their own lives. First, as
many advocates for such persons have argued, the most significant
barrier to their flourishing is not their disabilities themselves, but the
prejudice and hostility that they encounter in the wider society on
account of them. Persons newly confronted with a disability may have
internalized these perceptions and seek to end their lives before at-
tempting to adjust to their new limitations. Their caretakers may too
76 See Quill v. Vacco, 97 F.3d 708 (2nd Cir. 1996), revd 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
77 Derek Humphry, Letter, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1994, at 22. This was the position
taken by Derek Humphry, the founder of the Hemlock Society, immediately after
Oregon voters decided to legalize assisted suicide.
78 The roots of this expansion of the right are clearly identifiable in the overruled
Ninth Circuit en banc opinion in Compassion in Dying, 85 F.3d 1440 (1996), reuld sub
nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997), as I have argued in M.
Cathleen Kaveny, Assisted Suicide, Euthanasia, and the Law, supra note 4.
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easily acquiesce to the "reasonableness" of their suicidal desires, fail-
ing to recognize that most persons with disabilities gradually adjust to
their limitations and find that they can continue to live productive
lives. Second, because of the prejudice, there may be scant popular
support for continuing to devote so many societal resources to en-
abling persons with disabilities to live as full and productive lives as
possible. 79
However, there is another group of persons who might be
equally, if not more, vulnerable to societal pressures to end their own
lives rather than consuming social resources. Demographic statistics
suggest that the heaviest users of the option of assisted suicide will not
be morally independent individuals confronting the inexorable de-
cline of a tragic illness or accident that strikes them in their prime,
such as Noel Earley, Diane, or Janet Adkins. Rather, those most likely
to avail themselves of the "right to die" are poor, elderly women af-
flicted with the ordinary debilities of frail old age. First, women are
more likely to live longer then men. According to 1990 census data,
approximately two out of three people older than seventy-five were
female.80 Second and relatedly, elderly women are more likely to live
alone and to dominate the nursing home population, largely because
they outlive their husbands. In 1990, eight out of ten persons older
than sixty-five and living by themselves are women,8' as are three out
of four elderly residents of nursing homes.8 2 Third, elderly women
are more likely to be poor than elderly men. Three out of four per-
sons over the age of sixty-five who live in poverty are likely to be fe-
male. Women typically earn less than men, may spend less time in the
workforce, and are still to some extent disfavored by a Social Security
79 For discussions critical of assisted suicide by advocates for persons with disabili-
ties, see Stephen L. Mikochik, Assisted Suicide and Disabled People, 46 DEPAUL L. REV.
987 (1997) and Paul Steven Miller, The Impact of Assisted Suicide on Persons with Disabili-
ties-Is it a Right Without Freedom?, 9 IssuEs L. & MED. 47 (1993). For a discussion
supporting legal recognition of that right from the perspective of such an advocate,
see Andrew I. Batavia, Disability and Physician-Assisted Suicide, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1671-73 (1997). After surveying arguments on both sides of the issue, a position
paper issued by the National Council on Disability concludes that it is too dangerous
to legalize assisted suicide at the current time. See National Council on Disability,
Assisted Suicide: A Disability Perspective, March 24, 1997.
80 This and other helpful statistics can be found in Cynthia M. Taeuber &Jessie
Allen, Women in Our Aging Society: The Demographic Outlook, in WOMEN ON THE FRONT
LINES: MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF AN AGING AMERICA 11-45 (Jessie Allen & Alan Pifer
eds., 1993) [hereinafter WOMEN].
81 See id. at 28.
82 See BARBARA J. LOGUE, LAsT RIGHTS: DEATH CONTROL AND THE ELDERLY IN
AMERICA 268 (1993).
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system which was set up in the 1930s to protect a family structure in
which wives were supported by their husbands and there was very little
divorce. Consequently, most women have a smaller nest egg to take
care of them in old age. 83
How autonomous is such a woman's choice in favor of assisted
suicide likely to be? Again, there is cause to worry. First, at almost all
ages of life, women are more likely than men to suffer from depres-
sion that would impede their ability to assess their options in an accu-
rate manner.84 Second, as many feminists have pointed out, women
are subject to strong social expectations that they sacrifice their own
well-being for the good of others. For many women, this social expec-
tation creates or reinforces a strong reluctance to be a "burden" on
family members. In many instances, the burden of their care would
fall on their own overworked, middle-aged daughters. It is estimated
that fourteen million working-age Americans have a disabled parent
(or spouse) age sixty-five or older. The vast majority of care-givers are
women. 85 A recent study estimates that 40.8 percent, of daughters in-
volved in care-giving have quit their jobs or made other significant
work adjustments to accommodate the demands of that care.86 In
such situations, how many elderly mothers might consider the choice
of her own death to be the last, best sacrifice they can make for their
own daughters? It is a sobering thought.
VI. CONCLUSION
As much as we Americans like to consider ourselves independent
individualists, there is no escaping the fact that our choices are lim-
ited by the circumstances under which we find ourselves. There is no
doubt that dying, particularly dying in a hospital, is a terrible thing.
There is no doubt that most Americans do not receive treatment for
depression and state-of-the-art palliative care that can alleviate the suf-
fering of those who are dying.87 Yet, it is possible to provide the dying
with the type of care that honors their dignity even as they take their
83 See Patricia G. Miller, Why Women Get Poorer With Age, PITsBURGH POST-GA-
zETrE, Oct. 21, 1995, atA9. See also AMANDA S. BARUSH, Introduction to OLDER WOMEN
IN POVERTY- PRIVATE LIVES AND PUBLIC POLICIES (1994).
84 See Leslie Laurence, Longetivity a Mixed Blessing: Older Women Risk Depression,
ARIZONA REPuBLIc, Jan. 10, 1995, at D1.
85 See Susan E. Foster &Jack A. Brizius, Caring Too Much? American Women and the
Nation's Caregiving Crisis, in WOMEN, supra note 80
86 See R. I. Stone & Peter Kemper, Spouses and Children of Disabled Elders: How Large
a Constituency for Long-Term Care Reform, 67 MIBANK Q. 485-506 (1989).
87 See Dying Well in the Hospital: The Lessons of SUPPORT, 25 HASTINGS CENTER REP.
S1-S36 (1995) (special supplement).
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leave from this human community.8 8 If assisted suicide is legalized,
particularly in the moral and fiscal framework of managed care, there
is good reason to fear that we will lose our ability to see the value in
such care-taking, both for the dying person and for those she is leav-
ing behind. That, I believe, would be the greatest tragedy of all.
Mary Ann Glendon, in whose honor this essay is published, has
persistently explored the impact of positive law on the concrete well-
being of human persons, particularly those who do not belong to the
elite classes of their society. Never content to confine her analysis to
the theoretical justification of the law in question, she also traces its
practical effect upon the web of relationships they alter, often by ex-
amining sociological data relevant to its impact on various population
groups. Time and again, her analysis reveals how a legal framework,
that is theoretically justified by an appeal to increased individual au-
tonomy, in fact results in a practical constriction of choices for many
of those whom it affects. For example, in Abortion and Divorce in West-
ern Law,89 Glendon points out how liberalized "no-fault" divorce laws,
championed by many legal academics as a victory for individual
choice, actually placed many women in a financially desperate situa-
tion. Unwilling to jeopardize their own custody of their children in
divorce negotiations with their estranged husbands, many women
were pressured into accepting lower support payments in exchange
for a promise not to contest custody. A change in law that was liberat-
ing for upper class populations worked significant harm to those with
less means to protect themselves.
In effect, this essay has attempted to extend Glendon's abiding
concern for the concrete impact of positive law on the most vulnera-
ble members of our society to the question of assisted suicide. As
evinced by the reasoning employed by the en banc majority opinion
in Compassion in Dying v. Washington,90 the now-overruled Ninth Cir-
cuit case that would have made assisted suicide a constitutionally pro-
tected choice, this is an urgent task. Most disturbing about that
opinion was not the result that it reached by itself, but its willingness
to brush aside any practical dangers raised by the abstract autonomy-
based right that it championed. Oblivious to the shifting financial in-
centives of managed care, the opinion proceeds as if physicians will
virtually always act as an effective counterweight to a patient's prema-
88 See IRA ByocK, DYING WELL: THE PROSPECT FOR GROWTH AT THE END OF LIFE
(1997).
89 See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 99-104
(1987).
90 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
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ture desire to choose death.9 1 Oblivious to the vast disparity in the
cost of a lethal injection and the cost of competent hospice care for
the terminally ill,92 the opinion naively suggests that the real danger
facing the poor is that they will be denied a lethal prescription, not
that they will all too eagerly be given it. 9 3 Oblivious to widespread
views that persons with disabilities have an unacceptable quality of life,
it proceeds without considering the devastating pedagogical effect its
words might have on society's willingness to dedicate significant re-
sources to their assistance. 9 4
On the level of philosophical commitment, American society en-
compasses a range of views on the moral permissibility of physician-
assisted suicide, ranging from those who consider it a core aspect of
individual autonomy to those who view it as a betrayal of a physician's
obligation to care for and not to kill the patients in her charge. 95
That debate will not be settled any time soon. Nonetheless, like the
New York Task Force, we do not all need to agree about the morality
of assisted suicide to recognize the dangers of legalizing it in the midst
of the managed care revolution currently sweeping through all facets
of our health care system. Let us first ensure that the specific tempta-
91 See id. at 827. ("[M]ost, if not all, doctors would not assist a terminally ill pa-
tient to hasten his death as long as there were any reasonable chance of alleviating the
patient's suffering or enabling him to live under tolerable conditions.")
92 On February 26, 1998, the Oregon Health Services Commission, which is the
group responsible for determining the scope of services covered by the Medicaid pro-
gram in the state, voted 10:1 to make assisted suicide a covered service. In response to
a question about the cost of providing coverage, Hersh Crawford, the head of the
Oregon Office of Medical Assistance Programs, said "these are cheap prescriptions,
and health care provider time will not be significant." Brad Cain, Oregon Officials Say
Suicide Should Be a Tax-Funded Benefit, RocKYr MOUNTArN NEWS, Feb. 28, 1998, at 38A.
There is no indication that Mr. Crawford recognized any irony in his remark. Oregon
will need to cover the service entirely from state funds, since President Clinton signed
a law prohibiting the use of federal funds to pay for physician-assisted suicide in April
1997. The Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-12, 111
Stat. 23 (1997).
93 See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 825. ("The argument that disadvantaged
persons will receive more medical services than the remainder of the population in
one, and only one, area-assisted suicide-is ludicrous on its face.")
94 For example, the en banc court writes, "[a] competent, terminally ill adult,
having lived nearly the full measure of his life, has a strong liberty interest in choosing
a dignified and humane death rather than being reduced at the end of his existence
to a childlike state of helplessness, diapered, sedated, incontinent." Id. at 814. Such a
statement immediately places all those living in such a state of helplessness in the
rhetorical position ofjustifying why they would choose not to die.
95 See Leon R. Kass, M.D., Neitherfor Love Nor Money: Why Doctors Must Not Kill, in
MERCY OR MURDER? EUTHANASIA, MORALTrY, AND PUBLIC PoLICY (Kenneth R.
Overberg, SJ. ed., 1993)
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tions to wrongdoing inherent in managed care are well understood
and effectively counteracted before we consider extending the power
of physicians so far as to encompass a license to kill their patients. In
light of the well-publicized abuses that have been associated with the
transition to managed care, this type of legislative restraint should be
something that we all can agree is collectively owed to the most vulner-
able members of our community, as well as to ourselves, no matter
what our stand on the morality of assisted suicide considered as an
abstract issue.
